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Abstract
Recent trends in fertility and contraceptive prevalence indicate that the
marital fertility transition in Pakistan, which has been anticipated for three decades, has begun in the 1990s. Before that decade, the total fertility rate had
exceeded six births per woman for at least three decades, and fewer than 10 percent of married women practiced contraception. The most recent survey data,
collected in 1996–97, show a total fertility rate of 5.3 births per woman and a
contraceptive prevalence rate of 24 percent. Underlying this development are
macroeconomic trends that have led to widespread economic distress at the household level, and social changes that have diluted the influence of extended kin and
resulted in greater husband–wife convergence in reproductive decisionmaking.
The more-direct causes of declining fertility are a crystallization of existing desires for smaller families along with a decline in family size desires and a reduction in the social, cultural, and psychic costs of contraception. Improvements in
family planning services (their density and quality) have contributed little to the
onset of fertility decline but could be decisive in sustaining the decline over the
next decade. Other obstacles to contraceptive use, including fear of health side
effects and perceptions that husbands are opposed, must also be overcome in
order for contraceptive practice to become more widespread and the decline in
fertility to continue. Over the long term, progression to replacement-level fertility will require a substantial decline in the demand for children.

This material may not be reproduced in any form without written permission from
the authors.

Fertility in Pakistan has shown a stubborn resistance to change. Because of
sharp declines in mortality in the post–World War II period, the population of
Pakistan was growing at the rate of 2.7 percent per annum around 1960. In response to concern about rapid growth, a national policy of slowing population
growth was articulated in the 1960s, with a program of family planning services
as the main tool (Government of Pakistan 1965). During its first two decades,
however, the program appeared to have had scant impact on fertility: the total
fertility rate (TFR) continued to hover between six and seven births per woman
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and the population growth rate approached 3
percent per annum (Sathar 1993). Repeated assertions that marital fertility decline was underway proved to be illusory.1
In this paper we present empirical evidence from multiple and independent studies carried out in the past eight years demonstrating that marital fertility
decline has finally begun in Pakistan. The decline is gentle but nevertheless represents a genuine break from the past, most notably because of the increasing use
of modern contraception for the purpose of limiting family size. The slight declines in overall fertility prior to 1990 were due almost entirely to increases in
age at first marriage (United Nations 1993).
With a population of 130.5 million in 1998 (Population Census Organization 1998), Pakistan is the world’s seventh most populous country. According to
UN projections, it will become the third most populous by the year 2050. It is one
of only eight countries as of the mid-1990s with a population in excess of 25
million in combination with a TFR in excess of five births per woman (UN 1996).
Pakistan stands apart from its populous neighbors in South Asia, all of which
(with the exception of Nepal) experienced substantial declines in fertility prior to
1990 and therefore show markedly lower fertility in the mid-1990s (estimated
TFRs in 1995 are 2.2 for Sri Lanka, 3.4 for India and Bangladesh, and 5.4 for
Nepal).2 These comparisons raise questions about which factors have precipitated and sustained fertility transition in the region, in particular the contribution
of family planning programs (Shah and Cleland 1993). Some analysts credit the

rapid and, by many criteria, early fertility decline in Bangladesh to the effectiveness of the family planning program (Cleland et al. 1994). Pakistan’s program,
by comparison, has repeatedly been criticized for poor management and the low
quality of the services offered to the majority of its clients (Robinson et al. 1981;
Rukanuddin and Hardee-Cleaveland 1992; United Nations n.d.). An alternative,
and not necessarily contradictory, argument is that the motivation to limit fertility did not crystallize in Pakistan before the 1990s, and therefore responsibility
for the late transition cannot be placed entirely on an indecisive population policy
and inadequate family planning services (Sathar 1993).
This paper offers an update on fertility transition in Pakistan. We first review the evidence suggesting that important changes are underway. The paper
next describes the large-scale social and economic changes that have motivated
the recent changes in reproductive behavior. We then examine the more-direct
causes of these changes and the constraints on further changes. We conclude by
speculating about the prospects for further declines in fertility in Pakistan.
S TATUS OF THE F ERTILITY T RANSITION
Numerous fertility surveys indicate that the TFR remained above six births
per woman throughout the 1980s (see Table 1). Significantly, all estimates for the
1990s for the first time fall below 6.0 births per woman. The direct estimate of
the TFR for 1986–91 from the 1990–91 Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey (PDHS) is 5.4. This is almost certainly an underestimate, judging from the
evidence from reinterviews conducted with a subsample of PDHS respondents.
The reinterview data suggest that roughly 10 percent of births were omitted (Curtis
and Arnold 1994). Adjusting for this through the Gompertz relational model,
Juarez and Sathar (forthcoming) estimate that the TFR was probably around 6.1
for the period 1986–91, a figure that is consistent with the Pakistan Demographic
Survey estimate for 1992 of 5.8 (Federal Bureau of Statistics 1997). The estimate
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Table 1 Trends in fertility in Pakistan: Total fertility rates, by decade and survey
Decade and survey
1960s
Population Growth Estimation
Experiment (1962–65)
Pakistan Fertility Survey (1975)
National Impact Survey (1968–69)
Population Growth Survey (1968–71)
1970s
Pakistan Fertility Survey (1975)
Pakistan Labour Force and Migration
Survey (1979)
Pakistan Labour Force and Migration
Survey (1979)
Population Growth Survey (1976–79)
1980s
Pakistan Contraceptive Prevalence
Survey (1984–85)
Pakistan Demographic Survey (1984–88)
Pakistan Demographic and Health
Survey (1990–91)
Pakistan Demographic and Health
Survey (1990–91)
1990s
Pakistan Demographic Survey (1992)
Pakistan Contraceptive Prevalence
Survey (1994–95)
Pakistan Fertility and Family Planning
Survey (1996–97)
a

TFR

Period
covered
1962–65
1962–65
1965–69
1968–69
1968–71

Direct

Indirect
8.0a
6.1a

}
7.1
5.0
6.0

1970–74

6.3

1970–74

7.1

1975–79
1976–79

6.5
6.9

1984–85
1984–88

6.0
6.9

1986–91

5.4
6.1b

1987–91
1992

5.8

1994–95

5.6

1992–96

5.3

Two different methods of estimation were applied to the PGE data for this period.

b

This rate was calculated by Juarez and Sathar (forthcoming) using the Gompertz relational
model to adjust for misplacement errors and applies to 0–4 years before the survey.
Sources: Sathar (1993): Table 1; Population Council (1998b): Table 7.6; NIPS/LSHTM
(1998): Table 3.6.

from the 1994–95 Pakistan Contraceptive Prevalence Survey (PCPS) is slightly
lower yet at 5.6 for the period 1994–95 (Population Council 1998b). Collectively, these estimates imply a modest decline of 0.3 births during the four-year
period 1991 through 1994, which if extrapolated implies a TFR of 5.4 in 1997.3
The Pakistan Fertility and Family Planning Survey (PFFPS) of 1996–97 (NIPS/
LSHTM 1998) provides a direct estimate of 5.3 for the period 1992–96, which
suggests a slightly more rapid decline during the 1990s than implied by the previous surveys.4 Finally, the 1998 Census, whose provisional results were released
in July 1998, indicates that the average population growth rate for the period
1981–98 was 2.6 percent per annum, a decline from previous intercensal rates
and consistent with a decline in fertility in the 1990s.
All demographic analyses point to a decline in fertility in the 1990s. Over
the past four decades there has been no other period when demographers could
point with confidence to a decline of similar magnitude and duration (i.e. beyond
year-to-year fluctuation). Demographic estimation in Pakistan is a treacherous
business, however, because of the inaccurate reporting of ages and dates of events.
This is a familiar problem for those who have followed demographic research on
Pakistan: from the first demographic surveys carried out in the 1960s up to the
present, systematic response errors have frustrated efforts to construct an accurate picture of levels and trends in fertility and its proximate determinants (Shah
et al. 1986; Hashmi and Ahmed 1992). The more persuasive evidence that fertility decline is underway is provided by data on contraceptive practice. As indicated in Table 2, the fraction of currently married women reporting use of a method
of contraception at the time of the survey remained below 10 percent through the
1980s. Surveys in the 1990s, in sharp contrast, reveal a marked increase in the
contraceptive prevalence rate, from 12 percent in 1990–91 (PDHS) to 18 percent
in 1994–95 (PCPS) to 24 percent in 1996–97 (PFFPS), a rise of roughly 2 percentage points per annum. This rise in the fraction of married women using con-

6

Table 2 Trends in ever and current use of contraception among currently married women, by survey (percent)
Survey

Ever use

National Impact Survey (1968–69)
Pakistan Fertility Survey (1975)
Pakistan Contraceptive Prevalence Survey
(1984–85)
Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey
(1990–91)
Pakistan Contraceptive Prevalence Survey
(1994–95)
Pakistan Fertility and Family Planning
Survey (1996–97)

Current use

12.1
10.5

5.5
5.2

11.8

9.1

20.7

11.8

28.0

17.8

36.4

23.9

traception is the most compelling corroborating evidence that marital fertility is
declining.
The method-specific trends in Table 3 reveal that increased use of modern
methods, female sterilization and the IUD in particular, explains most of this
overall trend (7.9 points out of the 12.1 percentage point increase from 1990–91
to 1996–97). This finding should not overshadow the substantial contribution of
withdrawal, which alone accounts for almost one-third of the increase, more than
any other single method. This is an unusual feature that distinguishes the early
stages of Pakistan’s marital fertility transition from other Asian transitions in the
second half of the twentieth century (Population Council 1998a; Freedman 1995).
Urban–rural differentials in fertility provide further insight into the nature
of the fertility transition. This differential widened in the 1980s (see Table 4), as
marital fertility decline was initiated in the major cities, most notably Karachi
(NIPS/IRD 1992). The differential has widened further in recent years, with the
result that the urban–rural difference in the TFR exceeds 1.5 births as of the mid1990s. A corresponding urban–rural difference in contraceptive prevalence is also
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Table 3 Trends in current use of contraception by method among currently
married women (percent)
Survey
PDHS
(1990–91)

PCPS
(1994–95)

11.8

17.8

23.9

Any modern method
Condom
Pill
Injectable
IUD
Female sterilization
Other

9.0
2.7
0.7
0.8
1.3
3.5
0.0

12.6
3.7
0.7
1.0
2.1
5.0
0.1

16.9
4.2
1.6
1.4
3.4
6.0
0.3

Any traditional method
Rhythm
Withdrawal
Other

2.8
1.3
1.2
0.3

5.2
1.0
4.2
—

7.0
1.9
4.6
0.5

Method
Any method

PFFPS
(1996–97)

evident (36 percent and 18 percent in urban and rural areas respectively, according to the 1996–97 PFFPS). A closer examination of patterns over the past two
decades reveals that a pronounced increase in fertility control began among the
urban upper strata (as measured, for example, by female schooling) in the early
1980s and subsequently spread to other urban strata (Sathar and Mason 1993).
All the available data indicate that contraceptive prevalence did not begin to increase in rural areas until the 1990s and therefore has not yet had a noticeable
impact on fertility. The increase is found in each of the four provinces of Pakistan: as expected, Punjab has the highest prevalence levels, but the Northwest
Frontier province experienced the most rapid rise in contraceptive use in the early
1990s. The upshot is a transition that in its early stages is following a conventional pattern in which reproductive intentions and behavior change first among
8

Table 4 Trends in fertility by place of residence: Total fertility rates, by survey
Survey
Pakistan Fertility Survey (1975)
Pakistan Labour Force and Migration
Survey (1979)
Pakistan Contraceptive Prevalence
Survey (1984–85)
Pakistan Demographic Survey (1992)
Pakistan Demographic and Health
Survey (1990–91)
Pakistan Contraceptive Prevalence
Survey (1994–95)
Pakistan Fertility and Family Planning
Survey (1996–97)

Period

Urban

Rural

1970–74

6.2

6.4

1975–79

6.2

6.6

1984–85
1992

5.5/6.1a
6.2

6.2
7.3

1986–91

4.7/5.2a

5.6

1994–95

4.5

6.3

1992–96

4.2

5.7

a

The PCPS and the PDHS divided urban areas into major urban areas and “other” urban
areas; TFRs were higher in the latter category.

the upper social strata in the cities, with other urban residents and rural areas
lagging behind, roughly six or seven years in this instance. To the extent it persists, the urban–rural differential has implications for national fertility trends because Pakistan has been rapidly urbanizing (as compared, for example, to other
countries in South Asia). According to the 1998 Census, the urban population constitutes 33 percent of the total population (Population Census Organization 1998).
We place great weight on trends in contraceptive behavior because they
represent deliberate efforts by couples to break from the reproductive regime that
has characterized Pakistan in recent decades. A balanced assessment of this historic transformation must also consider the other major proximate determinants
of fertility: nuptiality, postpartum practices, and induced abortion. Information
on nuptiality is relatively abundant and shows a steady increase in the average
age at first marriage of females throughout the five decades from Independence:
singulate mean ages at first marriage calculated from census and survey data rise
9

from 16.9 years in 1951 to 21.6 years in 1990–91 (PDHS) and 22.1 in 1996–97
(PFFPS) (NIPS/LSHTM 1998). The rise has been somewhat sharper in urban
areas (Sathar 1997). Thus nuptiality change appears to have preceded the onset
of marital fertility decline in Pakistan, as in other Asian countries in the twentieth
century (Casterline 1994). The magnitude of the recent nuptiality change, however, is too slight to account for much of the estimated fertility decline in the 1990s.
Recent trends in postpartum behaviors are more difficult to discern because of gaps and incomparabilities in survey measurement over the past two
decades. The available evidence suggests that the overall length of breastfeeding
(unsupplemented and supplemented) has remained around 19 to 20 months from
the 1970s to the present (WFS 1984; NIPS/IRD 1992) and therefore has not contributed to the recent fertility decline.
There are no reliable estimates of the incidence of induced abortion.5 But
judging from qualitative investigations, induced abortion is a far more common
method of birth control in Pakistan in the 1990s than had been previously assumed. Whether recourse to induced abortion has increased in the 1990s is even
more difficult to ascertain, although this view is commonly volunteered by medical practitioners in Pakistan. Like withdrawal, induced abortion is a strategy for
limiting fertility that falls outside the purview of the family planning program.
In summary, a review of the evidence on trends in the proximate determinants of fertility provides no basis for questioning either the validity of the estimated fertility decline in the 1990s or the assertion that the decline is mainly due
to increased practice of contraception within marriage.
D ETERMINANTS OF R ECENT C HANGES IN F ERTILITY
We now turn to the question of which factors have led to this historic development. The context is laid out in Table 5, which presents trends in basic
demographic, economic, and social indicators. If one accepts the classic hypothesis that fertility transition is a response to declines in mortality and improve10

Table 5 Trends in demographic, economic, and social indicators
Population size (millions)
Population growth (percent per year)
Population density per square km of
agricultural land
Life expectancy at birth (years)
Infant mortality rate (deaths/1000
births)
GDP per capita (1987 US$)
Percent urban
Percent literate
Total
Female
Primary school enrollment ratio
Total
Female
Radios per 1000 population
Televisions per 1000 population

1960

1970

1980

1990

45.9
2.7

60.4
2.8

82.1
2.9

112
3.0

200
43

248
46

324
50

—
56

162
135
22

143
206
25

126
251
28

103
349
32

15
—

21
11

24
—

35
21

30
13
6
—

40
22
17
2

39
27
67
10

44
30
87
17

Sources: World Bank 1983, 1992; United Nations 1990, 1997.

ments in social and economic conditions, circumstances in Pakistan in the past
four decades support conflicting expectations. By many criteria the country’s
fertility transition is several decades overdue: mortality fell steadily beginning in
the 1950s, resulting in very rapid population growth by the 1960s that continued
through the 1980s. Urbanization, income, and literacy/schooling have increased
steadily throughout these decades. Exposure to the mass media, as indicated by the
prevalence of radios and televisions, increased dramatically beginning in the 1970s.
Offsetting these trends, however, were other conditions that acted against
fertility reduction. The social environment has not been conducive to fertility
change. By all measures, the status of Pakistani women is extremely low, even in
11

comparison to other settings in South Asia (UN 1993). Pakistani women lack
autonomy and have restricted mobility and minimal access to resources (Sathar
et al. 1988; Sathar and Kazi 1997). Virtually all social indicators reveal vast gender inequities. Despite improvement, levels of literacy and school attainment
remain extremely low among females (Table 5). The gender system gives disproportionate power to Pakistani men in decisionmaking about reproduction, and, as
will be noted shortly, macroeconomic and related trends up to the 1990s did not
provide men with a compelling reason to diverge from long-standing fertility
practices. Further buttressing the existing reproductive regime has been the feudal structure of Pakistani society in which political and economic power has remained in the hands of a small number of families, especially in rural Sind and
southern Punjab. These families have resolutely maintained pronatalist institutions and social values and have served as obstacles to the implementation of
effective social-sector programs. The religious milieu, which has consistently
maintained doubts about the moral acceptability of fertility control, constitutes
an additional stumbling block. Nor did macroeconomic trends provide a rationale for fertility reduction prior to the 1990s. The economy performed strongly
from the 1960s through the 1980s, with significant income growth resulting from
impressive output in the agricultural sector and from substantial remittances from
the Middle East, among other factors. GDP per capita grew at an average annual
rate of 2.7 percent during the period 1970–85 (Hasan 1997). Income growth was
inequitable and was not accompanied by investments in such social services as
schooling, health, and housing (Hasan 1997).
In short, whatever the economic costs to Pakistani couples of large numbers of births, these costs seemed affordable in a period of income growth and,
more to the point, were perceived as lower than the costs of challenging deeply
held cultural precepts about reproduction and women’s roles. This contrasts with
the historical process in East Asia, where economic development of a different
character fueled an upsurge in desires to restrict fertility (Greenhalgh 1988; Asian
12

Development Bank 1997). Accompanying this set of cultural, social, and economic factors that propped up the existing fertility regime in Pakistan was weak
and inconsistent political support for fertility reduction (Rosen and Conly 1996).
The end result of all these forces was deep ambivalence at the household level
about restricting fertility (Shah and Cleland 1993). A final factor, which perhaps
should be viewed as an expression of the combined force of all the other factors,
was the ineffectiveness of the family planning program, which left the vast majority of Pakistani couples without convenient access to adequate services
(Rukanuddin and Hardee-Cleaveland 1992).
Each of these factors sustaining higher fertility has weakened in the 1990s.
The macroeconomic data indicate that the steady economic growth of the 1970s
and 1980s slowed considerably in the 1990s. Annual growth in GDP per capita
declined to 1.2 percent in 1985–95 (Hasan 1997). The popular view is that the
country is in the midst of a deep economic crisis—blamed on the structural adjustment and related conditionalities imposed by the IMF and the World Bank—
and many economists concur (Hussain et al. 1997; Khan and Aftab 1997).6 The
economic crisis of the 1990s has compounded the stresses created by the longterm trend in rural areas toward land fragmentation and the more recent declines
in returns to many agricultural crops (Choudhry 1997). Symptomatic of labor
absorption problems in rural areas has been a growing stream of migrants from
rural to urban areas in search of off-farm employment, and as a result the population is increasingly urbanized (see Table 5). The outcome of these macroeconomic forces has been an increase in unemployment, a decline in real wages, and
consequent increases in poverty and income inequality (Hussain et al. 1997). In
retrospect, the relatively healthy economy of the 1970s and 1980s fueled a resistance to social change that the economic crisis of the 1990s has undermined.
Accompanying the sense of economic stress, and in some respects accentuating it, have been changes in life styles and in parental aspirations for chil-
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dren. These changes have led to a pronounced increase in the relative cost of each
child. The irony is that consumer aspirations have been rising at the same time as
purchasing power has been shrinking in real terms. The greater concentration of
the population in urban areas and the expanded exposure to the mass media (itself a result in part of urbanization) are the proximate causes of these changes.
These trends are shown in Table 5 for the period 1960–90. The trends continue in
the 1990s. For example, in the six-year period between the PDHS and the PFFPS
the fraction of households with televisions increased from 27 to 38 percent (NIPS/
IRD 1992; NIPS/LSHTM 1998). This has occurred despite the travails of the
economy and the decline in households’ purchasing power, revealing the rapidly
increasing attachment to modern consumer durables that itself must contribute to
increases in the perceived costs of childbearing. A much more modern Pakistani
life style is now transmitted through the media (particularly in advertising) to all
corners of the country, including rural areas that were previously isolated. This in
turn has had a direct bearing on how parents want to raise their children, with
implications for standards of hygiene and health, tastes in clothing and consumer
durables, and schooling aspirations. As Pakistanis themselves acknowledge in
qualitative interviews (Population Council 1997d), all these changes make children more costly; this has driven down the demand for children and increased the
perceived costs of unwanted births.
Changes in social structure, particularly in kinship relationships, are also
underway. In Pakistan, as elsewhere in the northern half of the Indian sub-continent, the traditional kinship structure places comparatively little emphasis on the
conjugal bond, which is viewed as a threat to highly valued consanguineous ties,
intergenerational ties in particular (Vatuk 1987; Das Gupta 1996). This system
also has the dual effect of restricting the decisionmaking power of spouses and,
perhaps more importantly, marginalizing women (especially young married women). Although key elements of this system have been changing, these changes do
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not include expanded decisionmaking power for women. The evidence suggests
that gender inequalities have been relatively constant in Pakistan, especially in
rural areas. The vast majority of women continue to lack mobility and decisionmaking power within the household, and do not communicate effectively with
their spouse (Sathar and Kazi 1997). We find no evidence that the overwhelming
authority of men vis-a-vis their wives — regarding childbearing and other matters — has diminished as of the mid-1990s.
It is not an increase in the autonomy of women that has been decisive
during the past decade but rather an increase in the autonomy of couples. Over
the past three decades, kinship relations and household structures have evolved
in a manner that has eroded the power of elders and other relatives, and as a result
decisionmaking about family matters has become more nucleated. One indicator
of this change is an increase in husband–wife discussion of fertility desires, reported by roughly one-third of respondents in the 1990–91 PDHS and by almost
double that fraction in the 1994–95 PCPS (NIPS/IRD 1992; Population Council
1998b). A second indicator of this change is the increase in nuclear-family households.7 About one-half of the households in Pakistan are now nuclear (Population
Council 1998b). When, as in Pakistan, a major cause of the growing predominance of nuclear households is rural-to-urban migration, in which couples with
or without children move to towns and cities and set up separate households, it is
much less likely that the new households are adjacent to households of extended
kin. Reinforcing the effect of migration in freeing couples from the daily influence of extended kin is the fact that migration in Pakistan selects positively for
literacy and schooling, among other reasons because of the job skills demanded
by the nonagricultural labor markets in towns and cities (Kazi and Sathar 1996).8
Among the effects of the increasing independence of the conjugal unit has
been greater consensus between spouses in their assessments of the costs and
benefits of childbearing and related domestic issues. The economic and other
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costs of children are now perceived as more exclusively the responsibility of
their parents, with the important consequence that Pakistani men have become
much more cognizant of the costs of children. This development is reflected in
recent survey and qualitative data that show both men and women acknowledging the advantages of restricting fertility, with women stressing health concerns
and men the economic costs of bearing many children (Population Council 1997c).
It is reflected, too, in the large contribution of male methods (withdrawal, condoms) to the recent increase in contraceptive prevalence (Table 3).
These broad economic and social changes in Pakistan are the fundamental
causes of the observed changes in the 1990s in fertility and its proximate determinants — contraception in particular — that were summarized above. These
fundamental causes have acted through a set of factors that are the more-direct
causes of the observed changes. We now turn to these more-direct causes, classifying them into three categories:
• Changes in the demand for children.
• Changes in family planning services, e.g. their density and/or quality.
• Changes in other factors constraining contraceptive use, e.g. the social,
psychic, and cultural “costs of contraception.”
D EMAND FOR C HILDREN
The earliest demographic surveys in Pakistan in the 1960s did not reveal a
demand for large families. The mean ideal family size reported in the 1968–69
National Impact Survey was 4.4 children and in the 1975 Pakistan Fertility Survey 4.1 children. As a result, the prevailing assumption for the past three decades
has been that there is a substantial latent demand for fertility regulation in Pakistan (Sirageldin et al. 1976; Shah and Cleland 1993). As in an earlier paper (Sathar
1993), we take issue with this conventional interpretation. We feel that in the past
latent demand for fertility regulation was in fact weaker than survey data have
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suggested, for four reasons: the limited autonomy of women, which for multiple
and reinforcing reasons has worked against the adoption of fertility regulation
practices (Sathar et al. 1988); the strong preference for male progeny; the relatively healthy state of the economy; and a political and cultural climate that looked
unfavorably on the deliberate exercise of fertility control. During the 1990s, fertility demand has changed in two fundamental respects: the desired number of
children has declined; and the attachment to fertility preferences has strengthened, i.e. preferences have “crystallized.” We consider both developments.
One basic fertility demand parameter is ideal family size, i.e. responses to
a question such as “If you could choose exactly the number of children to have in
your whole life, how many would that be?” The available evidence suggests a
sizable downward shift in ideal family size in the first half of the 1990s, from 4.1
in the 1990–91 PDHS to 3.6 in the 1994–95 PCPS. More valid measurement of
fertility preferences is probably provided by responses to the question “Do you
want another child?” The parity-specific percentages desiring no more children
increase between 1990–91 and 1994–95 (see Table 6). The trend for the 20 years
from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s is curvilinear: a gradual decline in
antinatalism from the 1975 PFS to the 1990–91 PDHS is followed by an increase
in the first half of the 1990s.
Ideal family size and the figures in Table 6 relate to the number of children
desired, but they say nothing about the strength of attachment to those desires.
The strength of preferences can vary independently of the number of children
desired, as a function for example of the perceived magnitude of the costs and
benefits of an additional child (Bongaarts 1993). The strength of preferences is
difficult to measure in demographic surveys. National surveys in Pakistan do not
contain items that permit an assessment of trends in the strength of fertility preferences; hence we can only rely on what we have concluded from empirical data
(quantitative and qualitative) collected in Pakistan over the past two decades.

17

Table 6 Trends in fertility preferences by number of living children: Percentage
of currently married women who want no more children, by survey
Number of
living children

PFS
(1975)

PCPS
(1984–85)

PDHS
PCPS
(1990–91)a (1994–95)

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7+

2
7
30
48
69
78
90
94

1
4
17
36
58
75
83
90

2
4
17
36
52
63
71
74

0
12
25
51
68
78
83
90

Total

49

43

40

52

a

Survey combines the responses “want no more” and “sterilized.”
Sources: PFS (1975): Population Planning Council of Pakistan 1976: Table 3.1.1; PCPS
(1984–85): Population Welfare Division, Government of Pakistan 1986: Table X.1; PDHS
(1990–91): National Institute of Population Studies 1992: Table 8.1; PCPS (1994(95): Ministry of Population Welfare 1995: Figure 5.1.

These data suggest to us that the degree of conviction about stated preferences is
much deeper in the 1990s than heretofore: there is a heightened consciousness of
these preferences, the preferences are in sharper focus (i.e. more explicitly articulated), and the determination to realize them is stronger, in comparison to
previous decades.
These changes in the demand for children are a response to the economic
adversity and other social changes described above. Qualitative interviews conducted in the mid-1990s reveal the link between a growing sense of economic
stress and an increased desire to restrict fertility (Population Council 1997c). In
these unstructured interviews, Punjabi men and women were asked about the
advantages and disadvantages of having many children and why they and/or their
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neighbors were motivated to practice family planning. Again and again, both
men and women emphasized the costs of children and, especially, how it has
become much harder to shoulder these costs in the difficult economic situation of
the 1990s.9 While not clearly articulated by the respondents, one senses that the
changes in life style aspirations and in childrearing aspirations that we noted
above have also contributed to the conviction that the household is falling short
economically. In inquiries carried out in earlier decades, the view that children
have become unaffordable was not stated as often or as vociferously (NIPS n.d.).
The diffusion of this conviction throughout the population appears to be a phenomenon of the 1990s.
Despite the growing sense that children are unaffordable, ideal family size
remains in excess of three children. According to the parity-specific percentages
of women wanting more births (Table 6), a small minority of women are content
with two children or fewer: in the 1994–95 PCPS, only one-quarter of the women
expressed a desire to stop at two surviving children, and 12 percent a desire to
stop with one child. A far larger fraction of women must be prepared to limit their
childbearing to two births or less if replacement-level fertility is to be achieved.
Westoff and Bankole (1995) have demonstrated this through simulations in which
various fractions of those women who express a desire to avoid pregnancy but
are not using contraception are assumed to be using a method. Under two simulations using 1990–91 PDHS data, contraceptive prevalence would increase from
12 percent to 27 percent and 38 percent. These would result in declines in the
TFR from 5.4 births per woman (the PDHS direct estimate) to 4.4 and 3.6, respectively, a range that roughly brackets the most recent estimates of the average
ideal number of children. These would be substantial declines in relation to present
fertility levels but would leave fertility far above replacement nevertheless.
Son preference partially accounts for the persistence of the desire for a
moderate number of births. Many women with three or more surviving children
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want to have more children in the hope of having a son (Mahmood 1996). Analyses of survey data collected in the 1990s consistently show that son preference
affects both fertility preferences and contraceptive use. In particular, even among
those women indicating a desire to postpone the next pregnancy or to avoid having another pregnancy altogether, the likelihood of using contraception increases
with the number of surviving sons (Population Council 1997a; Sathar and Kazi
1997). Two sons remain the basic minimum in the minds of most couples, and
there is no evidence that this view is waning significantly even in urban areas.
This powerful and highly conscious son preference is to be expected given the
many social and economic structures that devalue females and the reliance in a
patrilineal system on sons for support in old age (Sathar and Kazi 1997). Other
forces are responsible for a continuing preference for three or more children.
Despite substantial declines in the past four decades, infant and child mortality
levels remain relatively high (Table 5), and insecurity about child loss continues
to be an oft-cited reason in unstructured interviews for having a larger than ideal
family size (Population Council 1997c). Furthermore, a larger family size increases the likelihood that one or more children might enjoy success in employment or marriage, thereby improving the standing of the family. Particularly in
the large agricultural sector, children’s labor continues to be valued. Most Pakistani households view children as the most stable form of social and economic
security (Sathar and Kazi 1997).
F AMILY P LANNING S ERVICES
A second class of explanations for the onset of fertility decline in Pakistan
emphasizes improvements in family planning services, both in their density and
their quality. From its inception through the 1980s, the national family planning
program fell short on both counts (Robinson et al. 1981; Rukanuddin and HardeeCleaveland 1992). There are solid grounds for believing that the provision of
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family planning services has improved in the 1990s, extending a trend that began
in the 1980s, judging by Ross et al.’s family planning program effort scores (Ross
et al. 1992). Several new schemes that were launched in the Eighth Five-Year
Plan (1993–98) have begun to take root (Rosen and Conly 1996). Two innovations are noteworthy. The social marketing of contraceptives, begun in 1986, has
gained momentum in the 1990s. Despite some setbacks, social marketing has
probably improved accessibility in urban areas (Davies and Agha 1997; Agha
and Davies 1998). The Village-Based Family Planning Workers program, launched
on a pilot basis in 1992, now provides family planning services and advice in
about 8000 villages (Population Council 1997b).
Other initiatives may have contributed to the improvement of the family
planning service environment in the 1990s. The Prime Minister’s primary health
care program was launched in 1994, with another cadre of community-based
female workers posted in both urban slums and rural areas. Thirty thousand such
workers are believed to have been deployed with the responsibility to provide
primary health care, including family planning, to the communities from which
they were recruited (Ministry of Health 1996). Furthermore, Ministry of Health
outlets, including rural health centers and basic health units, now have a stronger
mandate to provide family planning.
Finally and perhaps most significantly, radio and television campaigns promoting family planning have picked up momentum, in terms of both their frequency
and the explicitness of the messages. The percentage of women who reported that
they had heard or seen a family planning message more than doubled between the
1990–91 PDHS and the 1994–95 PCPS, exceeding 60 percent in the latter survey
(NIPS/IRD 1992; Ministry of Population Welfare and Population Council 1995).
The radio and television messages both legitimize family planning practice and
offer concrete information about how contraceptives might be obtained. A recent
analysis comparing IEC impact in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan shows vast im-
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provements in the reach of family planning messages in the Pakistani media and in
their association with contraceptive adoption (Westoff and Bankole 1998).
Undoubtedly, then, family planning program activities have improved in
the 1990s and probably deserve some credit for the recent increase in contraceptive prevalence and the resulting decline in fertility. But the important enhancements in services were implemented only in the mid-1990s and hence cannot be
given credit for the sharp increase in contraceptive prevalence in the first half of
the decade. In our judgment, the contribution of improvement in family planning
services has been minor as compared to the contribution of the other major factors (changes in the demand for children, reduction in other costs of contraception). An indication that this is so is the fact that a substantial fraction of the
increase in contraceptive prevalence in the 1990s has been due to use of withdrawal: 3.4 points out of the 12.1 percentage point increase between 1990–91
and 1996–97 (see Table 3). Withdrawal is a means of avoiding pregnancy that is
free of any dependence on contraceptive supplies or services and, indeed, is often
regarded as a sign that fertility decline is more the result of increasing motivation
to avoid pregnancy than of improvements in the means to do so (Santow 1995).
Family planning services remain deficient in many respects. For example,
basic coverage of the population is deficient in both urban and rural areas, especially the latter. Various criteria classify far less than half of the population as
having convenient access to any type of services. One study concludes that family planning clinics (the Family Welfare Centres) are accessible to only 10 percent of the population, with only 5 percent living within easy walking distance
(Rosen and Conly 1996). Data from the 1994–95 PCPS show an average traveling time to a family planning service delivery point of 60 minutes in rural areas
(as compared to 15 minutes in urban areas). The nearest facility is three or more
miles away for 61 percent of never users in rural areas and for 13 percent of never
users in urban areas. Clearly clinics are far closer on average for women in urban
areas, but access is a serious obstacle nevertheless because of the many restric22

tions on women moving about outside their dwellings. The upshot is that a small
minority of women report having had contact with a family planning worker
(Ministry of Population Welfare and Population Council 1995), and this is essentially unchanged since the late 1970s (Syed 1979). The social marketing and the
Village-Based Family Planning Workers schemes hold much promise of significantly improving access to supplies and services, although rural areas remain
largely untouched by social marketing (Davies and Agha 1997).
Beyond access, serious problems affect the quality of family planning services. The situation analyses that have been carried out are unambiguous on this
point (e.g. Cernada et al. 1993). Outlets rarely offer a choice of methods and
informed advice about alternative methods, often do not have sufficient supplies
on hand, and typically lack an adequate number of trained staff. Pakistani couples
concur with this evaluation: in unstructured interviews, men and women (especially rural residents) repeatedly describe providers as poorly trained and unmotivated and the contraceptive supplies as defective and unreliable (Population
Council 1997c). The majority of women, especially in rural areas, seek family
planning services in large hospitals; other types of outlets, even where available,
are rarely visited (Population Council 1998b).
This harsh evaluation of the family planning program is based on evidence
from careful local studies. Like Freedman (1995), we feel that Ross et al.’s (1992)
rating of the program effort in Pakistan as “moderate” is too favorable, probably
reflecting undue weight given to policy rhetoric and formal bureaucratic structure and too little weight given to the extent and quality of the services actually
provided to Pakistani couples.
O THER C OSTS OF C ONTRACEPTION
Our third explanation for recent changes is that other forces that hinder
contraceptive use have weakened. Many types of evidence suggest that the costs
of using contraception in Pakistan go well beyond the financial and time costs of
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obtaining family planning supplies and services of acceptable quality. We refer to
social, psychic, health, and cultural factors that, together with financial and time costs,
constitute what Easterlin (1975) terms the “costs of contraception.” These factors are
not easily measured, hence their contribution is difficult to assess empirically. A
reading of the literature on fertility in Pakistan since the 1960s and evidence
obtained through in-depth qualitative and quantitative research conducted in
Punjab province in 1996 suggest that three obstacles to fertility control behavior
weakened significantly in the 1990s: the view that family planning is proscribed
by moral and religious codes (Shah and Shah 1984); the view that extendedfamily members, and parents in particular, have a rightful voice in the fertility
decisions of a husband and wife; and the view that contraceptive practice threatens men’s authority over women. For contraceptive practice to become widespread, these views must be undermined through a process that legitimizes couples’
capacity to take deliberate actions to avoid pregnancy (Shah and Cleland 1993).
Such a process has been evident in Pakistan in the 1990s, driven by related
social and economic changes. Among the most important of these have been the
changes in family structure described above, which have eroded the power of
elders and other extended kin, especially among migrants to urban areas (Kazi
and Sathar 1996). This erosion of power undermines the second of the obstacles
just identified. We have argued that one consequence of this change in family
structure is greater concurrence, and most likely better communication, between
spouses about the costs of children and a heightened sense that these costs are
shared. For example, in data collected in 1996 Punjabi women report little hesitance in approaching their husbands about using contraception (Population Council
1997a). This has meant, in turn, that family planning practice does not threaten
gender relations to the extent it did in the past; in the 1990s, to use contraception
is not to act against the interests of the husband. Moreover, couples often opt for
those contraceptive methods — withdrawal, condoms — that are male-controlled
(see Table 3), further reducing the threat contraception might pose to patriarchal
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interests. Finally, the realization that raising children is costly, and that these
costs are increasing, counters the conviction that use of contraception is immoral.
In unstructured interviews, male respondents in particular cite the moral duty to
provide for children’s needs, a duty that is difficult to fulfill with a large family
(Population Council 1997c). These factors have led to greater legitimization of
contraception, reinforced by the convincing antinatalist pronouncements of government officials since Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s public endorsement of
family planning in 1991 (repeated in 1997 and 1998), by the intensification of
media campaigns espousing family planning, and by the greater visibility of family
planning program activities at local levels, particularly in rural areas.
What has been underway in Pakistan — first in urban areas, more slowly
in rural areas (probably beginning in the Punjab) — is a social dynamic in which
family planning has acquired the acceptability that it lacked in the past. There is
a shift of values away from traditional to modern, and a shift in the locus of
decisionmaking from extended kin to the conjugal couple. The dynamic has its
own momentum: as some Pakistani couples begin to practice contraception and
this becomes known, the same choices become more acceptable to other couples.
Couples may also acquire useful information from each other, about where to
obtain services and how to cope with health side effects of contraception, for
example. In this fashion the social, psychic, and cultural barriers to contraception
begin to collapse, very much resembling a “contagion” process. This dynamic
may well characterize most fertility transitions at some stage (Montgomery and
Casterline 1996). It provides one of the more plausible and parsimonious explanations for the sudden increase in contraceptive prevalence in Pakistan in the
1990s after several decades during which surveys repeatedly suggested that latent demand for fertility control far exceeded contraceptive practice.
While certain costs of contraception may be on the wane, others remain as
serious obstacles to adopting and continuing use of contraception. As a result,
despite the recent sharp increase in contraceptive prevalence, “unmet need for
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contraception” (i.e. non-use of contraception by women at risk of pregnancy who
desire to avoid becoming pregnant) remains high—on the order of one-third of
currently married women (Westoff and Bankole 1995; Population Council 1998b;
NIPS/LSHTM 1998). Indeed, comparison of estimates from the three national
surveys conducted in the 1990s suggests that unmet need may even be on the
increase, a common pattern in the early stages of fertility transition as declines in
demand for children outpace increases in contraceptive use (Bongaarts 1997). In
a recent in-depth study conducted in the Punjab on factors underlying unmet
need, three factors emerge as the most decisive obstacles to family planning:
women’s perceptions that their husbands disapprove; fear of detrimental health
side effects of contraception; and concerns about the social, cultural, and religious acceptability of birth planning (Population Council 1997a).10 These and
other considerations conspire to make many women feel that the decision to use
contraception is both unacceptable on social and cultural grounds and against
their best interests, even if they wish to avoid pregnancy. In transcripts from
unstructured interviews, the anxiety that women feel about the decision whether
or not to use contraception is almost palpable. Conflicting forces encourage and
discourage family planning practice. The resulting ambivalence makes it difficult for many women to use contraception, especially given the effort required to
obtain a method in the many communities where family planning services are
distant and/or of poor quality.
These considerations are compounded by the limited autonomy of women
in this and other spheres of life, which as noted above does not appear to be
changing to any meaningful extent. The experience of East Asia in the period
1950–80 demonstrated that fertility can decline to relatively low levels despite
the low status of women; there are no grounds for asserting that increased autonomy is a precondition for fertility transition. Nevertheless, the lack of female
autonomy almost certainly hinders the transition from a high to low fertility re-
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gime: the expression of women’s desire for fewer children is muted, and the
range of contraceptive choices is restricted (Jejeebhoy 1995). In addition, many
women who wish to postpone or terminate childbearing perceive that their husbands desire more children and oppose contraceptive practice. In fact, empirical
data collected in the mid-1990s indicate that men have more positive views about
contraception (and particular contraceptive methods) and are less pronatalist than
their wives assume (Population Council 1997a). However, given the limited communication between spouses and the unequal balance of power in gender relations, these misperceptions by wives are not readily corrected and are a stronger
deterrent than would be the case in many other settings. The result is that Pakistani women often take the safe route of not implementing their fertility preferences, in deference to the presumed pronatalism of their husbands. It is hardly
surprising that men have played a decisive role in the developments of the 1990s,
as reflected, for example, in the relatively large contributions of increased use of
withdrawal and condoms.
C ONCLUSIONS
Evidence is accumulating that a transition in marital fertility behavior has
begun in Pakistan in the 1990s. The evidence is of several types and comes from
multiple and independent sources. In searching for the forces underlying this
development, we have emphasized changes in the demand for children — a crystallization of existing desires for smaller families, combined with a decline in
family size desires (itself reflecting broader macroeconomic and social changes)
— as well as changes in the social, psychic, and cultural costs of contraception.
We give less credit to improvements in family planning services, although they
have made a contribution. In examining the obstacles to further changes in fertility, in contrast, we have stressed the immediate need for improvements in family
planning services and for further reductions in other costs of contraception. Tak-
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ing this assessment of the constraints on further change as a starting point, we
can sketch likely scenarios for the next decade or so, and we can identify the
types of policies that might render certain scenarios more or less likely.
Because a large fraction of currently married women have unmet need for
contraception, in theory a substantial increase in contraceptive use and a corresponding decline in fertility could occur without any change in fertility preferences (Shah and Cleland 1993).11 This is an important conclusion from the standpoint of near-term policy formulation and program development. But from the
standpoint of the longer-term goal of achieving replacement-level fertility in Pakistan, the demand for children must be regarded as the most serious constraint.
As noted above, Westoff and Bankole (1995) estimate that, were existing unmet
need to be satisfied, the TFR would remain in the range 3.6 – 4.4 births per
woman, a level that implies continued rapid population growth.
A first point is that the downward trend in the demand for children apparent in the early 1990s is likely to continue to exert downward pressure on fertility. As a natural outcome of a growing awareness that marital fertility can be
deliberately regulated, the strength of attachment to desires for moderate or small
numbers of children (i.e. less than five) will grow, while simultaneously the fraction of couples desiring large numbers of children will decline, in response to the
trends in economic aspirations and perceived costs of children described above.
Pakistan is increasingly urbanized, and childrearing and consumer aspirations
that have antinatalist implications are spreading to lower socioeconomic strata
and rural areas. Most importantly, the economic situation continues to deteriorate, accompanied by the widespread sense of economic distress. Hence we expect that a growing fraction of Pakistani couples will wish to limit their number
of children to less than four. Eventually this will undermine the marked differentials in reproductive behavior according to place of residence (urban or rural) and
level of schooling that have typified the past two decades.
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Are these changes in demand likely to be matched by rises in contraceptive
prevalence and declines in fertility? In the long run the answer must be yes. In the
short run, however, the answer is dependent on the extent of changes in family
planning service delivery. A particular need is greater coverage in rural areas,
where the limited mobility of women makes even modest travel distances to family planning services and supplies an imposing barrier to the adoption and continued use of contraception. One strategy would be to depend mainly on an extensive network of private services in urban areas (here we second Rukanuddin
and Hardee-Cleaveland 1992 and Rosen and Conly 1996 in calling for greater
reliance on the private sector, both NGOs and medical practitioners), with public
resources then freed up for more extensive deployment in rural areas. Efforts
must also be made to upgrade the quality of services. Interviews in the 1996
study in Punjab reveal the dim view of public-sector services held by many women
and men. In short, given the heightened motivation to restrict fertility, the key in
the short run to maintaining and perhaps even accelerating the fertility transition
in Pakistan will be improvements in family planning services.
The onset of the transition has been triggered by changes in fertility demand and by reductions in the social, psychic, and cultural costs of contraception. None of these costs has been entirely eliminated. If family planning services remain inadequate, then we expect that unmet need for family planning
will remain at its current high level or even increase. Under the most desirable
scenario the ongoing declines in demand for children would be accompanied by
radical improvements in the supply and quality of family planning services. This
scenario offers the conditions for a very rapid fertility decline in Pakistan over
the next decade or so.
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Notes
1

On the basis of a detailed analysis of the birth histories collected in the
1975 Pakistan Fertility Survey, Alam (1984) concluded that fertility decline had begun in the early 1970s. This conclusion was later refuted by
Retherford et al. (1987), who demonstrated that the impression of decline
could almost certainly be attributed to reporting errors. Similarly, a decline in marital fertility in the late 1980s evident in direct estimates from
the Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey of 1990–91 (NIPS/IRD 1992)
disappears when the data are subjected to more rigorous analyses that adjust for problems of data quality (Curtis and Arnold 1994; Juarez and Sathar
forthcoming).

2

A far lower TFR for Nepal is proposed by Dangol et al. (1997). On the
basis of analysis of survey data from the 1970s to the early 1990s, they
conclude that the TFR as of 1991 was 4.78. According to their analysis, the
marital fertility transition in Nepal was progressing relatively rapidly as of
the late 1980s.

3

This is consistent with the United Nations (1996) estimate for the TFR in
1995 of 5.5 births per woman.

4

The PFFPS estimates will need to be scrutinized. In Pakistan, fertility estimates derived from birth histories typically are downwardly biased for the
period immediately preceding the survey. Even so, it seems likely that as
of 1998 the TFR falls in the range of 5.0 – 5.5 — rather high by international and regional standards but one birth less than the level that characterized the previous 30 years.

5

In the 1994–95 PCPS, 5.9 percent of women aged 35 and older reported
that their most recent pregnancy ended in an abortion, spontaneous or in30

duced. Less than 1 percent of the women reported an induced abortion.
Recognizable spontaneous abortions should be on the order of 15 to 20
percent among women in this age group.
6

The rupee has weakened substantially since the early 1980s, driving up the
local price of essential items that are import-dependent such as cooking
oil, kerosene, and fertilizer. The consumer price index trebled between
1982 and 1995 (Hasan 1997), and according to authoritative (but unofficial) estimates the rate of inflation in the costs of basic goods in the 1990s
has exceeded 20 percent per annum.

7

A number of independent sources confirm this assertion. We have compared the distribution of households by type in the 1975 PFS and the 1990–
91 PDHS. The comparison is not exact, because of definitional differences
in the household structure variables in the two data sets. Our comparison
probably understates the amount of change. We find that the percentage of
households that are nuclear has been relatively stable in rural areas but has
increased by ten percentage points in urban areas. This is consistent with
our argument below that urban Pakistani couples in particular are experiencing new-found independence in reproductive decisionmaking, as reflected in the much greater recent change in fertility in urban areas.

8

There is good evidence that household structure is associated with women’s
autonomy. Data collected in the Punjab in 1993 show that women living in
nuclear households have greater autonomy: 62 percent and 22 percent of
women living in nuclear households make decisions regarding schooling
of children and major household purchases, respectively, compared to 46
percent and 12 percent of women living in extended households (Sathar
and Kazi 1997). The same study finds that women living in nuclear households have greater mobility; for example, 40 percent of these women are
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able to go to a health center alone, compared to 19 percent of those living
in extended households.
9

Ironically, the economic adversity created by the combination of stagnant
wages and rising costs of basic goods has made contraceptives less affordable for most households. This circumstance is especially relevant for
methods such as injectables, oral contraceptives, and condoms that are
supplied primarily by the private sector. Agha (1998) shows strong crosssectional associations between the use of some of these methods and household income.

10

A similar set of factors is identified in Hashmi et al.’s (1993) research in
the early 1990s on reasons for non-use.

11

Our 1996 research in Punjab province (Population Council 1997a) revealed
that weak attachment to stated fertility preferences is among the reasons
for unmet need for contraception. It follows that increased contraceptive
practice could also result from further crystallization of preferences and
stronger convictions about those preferences.
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